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California Extends The Right of Publicity
to Heirs: A Shift From Privacy to
Property and Copyright Principles
by SusAN G. BLUER*
I
Introduction
A growing number of states have adopted the "right of pub-
licity" in recognition of the pecuniary worth attached to a ce-
lebrity's name, image, or likeness.' An offshoot of the law of
privacy,2 the right of publicity is "the right of each person to
control and profit from the publicity values which he has cre-
ated or purchased."3 This right has attracted substantial atten-
tion from commentators who have criticized its disparate
application,4 particularly with respect to whether or not the
right of publicity is descendible.5
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. The states which have adopted the right of publicity either by statute or case
law are: California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin; see infra notes
69-118 and accompanying text.
2. The right of privacy is the personal, nonassignable and nondescendible "right
to be let alone." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195
(1890). See, e.g., Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real Peo-
ple by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); see also infra notes 17-30 and accompany-
ing text.
3. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 216 (1954).
4. See, e.g., id.; Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny
and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1975); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2;
Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial
Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Hoffman, The Right of Publicity--Heir's
Right, Advertiser's Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1981);
Comment, The Right of Publicity Revisited. Reconciling Fame, Fortune and Consti-
tutional Rights, 62 B.U.L. REv. 965 (1982); Comment, An Assessment of the Copyright
Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 786 (1982); Kwall, Is Indepen-
dence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 191 (1983).
5. Descendible means "[c]apable of passing by descent, or of being inherited or
transmitted by devise." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 400 (5th ed. 1979). Once a right
descends, the heir becomes the exclusive manager of the right, and is able to initiate
legal action in his or her own behalf. Descendibility should not be confused with
survivability of an action; "[s]urvlval refers to the continued life of a cause of action
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Several societal interests are advanced when the right of pub-
licity is descendible. First, the celebrity is allowed to control
who may profit from the commercial use of his image after he
is dead.6 Second, advertisers are discouraged from exploiting a
deceased celebrity's image without first obtaining the consent
of that celebrity's heirs.7 Third, heirs may prevent unjust en-
richment to advertisers by making them pay for the privilege of
exploiting a deceased celebrity's name or likeness.8 Finally, the
public benefits because entertainers are encouraged to develop
their talents to the fullest, including the creation of a distin-
guishable public image.' This benefit is illustrated by the role
entertainers play in enhancing social diversity.
Until January 1, 1985, it was unclear whether or not there
was a descendible right of publicity in California, and if so, how
it operated. The leading pre-1985 California case, Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures,1 ° created confusion in California and in
other states forced to interpret the case under choice of law
rules." While one court interpreting Lugosi held that, in Cali-
fornia, a publicity right never descends,12 other courts deter-
after the death of the person originally entitled" to bring the action. Note, Inadequa-
cies of English and State Survival Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1008 n.1 (1935).
6. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (de-
cedent Agatha Christie assigned rights to her literary works to plaintiff Agatha Chris-
tie Ltd. by testamentary disposition); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
836,838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decedents Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy granted plain-
tiff Harmon Pictures the right to acquire in perpetuity the exclusive right to utilize
and merchandise their names, likenesses, characters and characterizations.)
7. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 4, at 11.
8. Id.
9. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977)
(defendant's broadcast of plaintiff's entire human cannonball act posed a substantial
threat to the economic value of that performance by undermining plaintiff's exclusive
control over the publicity given to his performance); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors
Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (allowing the
right of publicity to descend fulfills the social policy of encouraging individual creativ-
ity); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 839, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 339 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (the broader social objective implicit in accord-
ing judicial protection to the right of publicity is to secure the benefits of intellectual
and artistic creation for the entire society); see also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at
1601; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 11.
10. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
11. The law of the state where the deceased celebrity was domiciled will be ap-
plied in right of publicity cases. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws §§ 52-59 (1964); 23
Am. JuR. 2D Descent and Distribution §§ 16-17 (1964).
12. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1979).
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mined that the right does descend under certain conditions.1 3
A recently enacted California statute 4 extends all of the
rights of publicity available under section 3344 of the California
Civil Code to eligible heirs who have registered their claims
with the Secretary of State.'15 California's new law eliminates
the ambiguities in Lugosi and provides extensive right of pub-
licity protections that are unsurpassed in any other state. By
affirming the descendibility of the right of publicity, California
has succeeded in transferring the right from a personal protec-
tion under tort law to a commercial asset under property law.
In addition, the statute resolves first amendment concerns in
limiting free expression, and sets forth clear exceptions to
wrongful use of another's publicity rights.'l
This Note initially discusses the evolution of the right of pub-
licity, explains the problems caused by Lugosi in and out of Cal-
ifornia, and evaluates the treatment other states have given the
issue of descendibility. Part II highlights the key aspects of
California's new law and suggests the effect the law will have
upon those persons it most directly concerns. Part III con-
cludes that California's legislative action in the area of publicity
rights is unique and suggests that the California statute should




A. From Privacy to Publicity
The right of privacy was first proposed in a law review article
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 7 Dean Prosser later
subdivided the right into four categories: (1) unreasonable and
highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) placement of another
13. Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Acme
Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983).
14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
15. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1985) was also amended, effective January
1, 1985, to add misappropriation of another's voice and signature to the formerly pro-
tected name, photograph, and likeness. Throughout this Note the terms "name,"
"likeness," "image," and "identity" will be used interchangeably in reference to a ce-
lebrity's publicity rights. There are not yet any published California cases involving
the newly protected voice and signature publicity rights.
16. See if-ra note 127 and accompanying text.
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
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in a false light in the public eye; and (4) misappropriation of
another's likeness for commercial purposes.'8 A common law
right of privacy is recognized in California by both the courts'
and the state constitution.20
The right of privacy protects injury to feelings.2 ' Specifically,
it gives someone whose personal information, identity or char-
acteristics have been wrongfully disclosed or exploited a cause
of action for violation of the right to be let alone.2 Since the
gravamen of a privacy action is injury to feelings, California
courts have held that the right of privacy is personal, nonas-
signable and nondescendible.23
In addition to barring transfer of the right of privacy, courts
have also been reluctant to allow celebrities to bring a privacy
action for misappropriation.' The courts' hesitation appears to
stem from the restricted scope of the privacy action as a remedy
for injured feelings. Since celebrities seek the public limelight,
many courts feel they thereby waive any invasion of privacy
action when their image is commercially exploited.2
For example, in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,26 the court ques-
tioned whether a plaintiff could invoke the right of privacy to
prevent a calendar manufacturer from using the plaintiff's pho-
tograph on its products. The court concluded that no privacy
action existed because the plaintiff, the most publicized football
player of the year, had essentially surrendered his right of pri-
18. W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.
1984).
19. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971) (plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy against defendant
based on the publication of an article disclosing that plaintiff had committed a
"hijacking").
20. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides that "[a]ll people are by nature free and in-
dependent and have inalienable rights. Among these are... pursuing and obtaining
... privacy."
21. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 208.
22. See, e.g., Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at 1582.
23. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 313, 132
Cal. Rptr. 860, 862 (1976); Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d
59,62, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429,431 (1975); Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111,
116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 211 (1961); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d
718, 721, 325 P.2d 659, 661 (1958).
24. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 204-06 (citing Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10
Ohio Op. 338 (1938) and Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp.
1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939)).
25. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 205 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at
215) (celebrity only has privacy action with respect to his non-professional life).
26. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
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vacy by seeking fame and notoriety.2 The defendant was thus
allowed to make money from the unauthorized sales of the cal-
endars containing the plaintiff's name and likeness. The plain-
tiff was denied damages for injury to his feelings and was
unable to receive the profits that were derived from the com-
mercial exploitation of his image.2s
To a lesser extent, right to privacy actions have been limited
by first amendment considerations. Some courts have sug-
gested that a celebrity's right of privacy is outweighed by first
amendment interests in freedom of expression.2 Other courts
have recognized a celebrity's economic interest in his commer-
cial image and have held that while the public should have ac-
cess to biographical and newsworthy information about
celebrities, persons should not be entitled to unlimited com-
mercial exploitation of celebrities' images.3°
Faced with the limitations involved in maintaining a privacy
action when there has been a misappropriation of name or like-
ness, some celebrities have brought lawsuits alleging unfair
competition. To a great extent, this theory has also proved in-
adequate. The following are methods of competition consid-
ered unfair in certain suggested legislation:
(1) passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding
as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods
or services;
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, ap-
proval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or [qualities]
that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, ap-
proval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have.31
The unfair competition theory is difficult to maintain be-
cause many celebrities never endorse any products. Even a ce-
lebrity that has endorsed a product will be unable to succeed in
27. I at 170.
28. Id.
29. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 2, at 1587 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) and Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808-10 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
30. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at nn. 90-92 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US. 374
(1967) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
31. 29 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 146 (1970). The Council of State Govern-
ments proposed a variety of methods of unfair competition to be used as a guide for
states wishing to enact unfair competition laws. IcE at 146-47.
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an unfair competition action if the defendant's product is not in
direct competition with the celebrity's.3 2 For example, an ad-
vertiser may use Barbra Streisand's image to market breakfast
cereal without triggering an unfair competition claim if
Streisand has only previously endorsed a brand of pudding.
Prompted by the inadequacy of the right of privacy and un-
fair competition theories, the Second Circuit introduced the
right of publicity doctrine in Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chew-
ing Gum.' In that case, plaintiff obtained the exclusive right
to use a ball player's photograph in connection with the sale of
gum.34 Before the expiration of plaintiff's contract, defendant
induced the ball player to enter into a similar contractaw
The district court dismissed the action, stating that the con-
tract with the plaintiff constituted no more than a release of
liability for what would otherwise be an invasion of the ball
player's privacy.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision and held:
[I]n addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy, a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph .... [and
this] right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his pic-
ture... may validly be made without an accompanying trans-
fer of a business or of anything else.'
The court thus declared that a right of publicity existed and
was assignable.
Commentators recognize that a right which is severable and
assignable is not personal.-s Thus, the logical extension of
Haelen is that an interest which is capable of inter vivos trans-
fer, that is to say assignable, is not personal and is therefore
descendible. An examination of California case law prior to
January 1, 1985, and a look at other states' treatment of the
descendibility issue illustrates the courts' unwillingness to em-
brace this conclusion and illuminates the reasons why section
990 was added to the California Civil Code.
32. See, e.g. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 19; Nimmer, supra note 3, at 210 (citing
Women's Mut. Benefit Soc'y v. Catholic Soc'y Feminine, 304 Mass. 349, 23 N.E.2d 886
(1939)); Acme Screen Co. v. Pebbles, 159 Okla. 116, 14 P.2d 366 (1932); Scutt v. Bassett,
86 Cal. App. 2d 373, 194 P.2d 781 (1948).
33. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
34. Id. at 867.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 868.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 3, at 209; Kwall, supra note 4, at 210.
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B. California Case Law
The California Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
descendibility of the right of publicity in Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures.9 In that case, the heirs of Bela Lugosi brought a civil
action against Universal Pictures seeking to: (1) recover profits
made by the defendant in its licensing of the use of the Count
Dracula character to commercial firms, and (2) enjoin the de-
fendant from negotiating future licenses without the heirs' con-
sent. In determining that the decedent had a protectible
property right as to his facial characteristics and his individual
likeness and appearance, the trial court found that his heirs ac-
quired all right, title, and interest in this property under the
decedent's will. The California Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's finding that the right of publicity descends uncon-
ditionally and held that the right did not descend in Lugosi's
case.40 As a result, Universal was allowed to use Lugosi's image
and retain all of the profits from its licensing venture.
The Lugosi court initially discussed the right of privacy, em-
phasizing that the right is personal and nondescendible. 41 Then
the majority addressed the right of publicity and concluded
that, where a celebrity commercially exploits his name or like-
ness during his lifetime, he has created a property right that
may be assigned.42
The court determined that the decedent did not meet this
"commercial exploitation requirement" because he failed to
use his name or likeness in the operation of a business or to sell
a product. The court stated that had Lugosi commercially ex-
ploited his name, thereby giving it what the court termed a
"secondary meaning,"43 and then transferred his publicity
rights to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs would have had a valid
claim against Universal."
The only rationale the court offered for rejecting
descendibility to heirs of celebrities who had not exploited
their images was:
If rights to the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property
never exercised during the lifetime of their creators were to
39. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
40. I at 822-24, 603 P.2d at 430-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
41. Id. at 821, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
42. Id. at 823-24, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
43. Id at 818, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
44. Id. at 820-24, 603 P.2d at 429-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327-29.
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survive their death, neither society's interest in the free dis-
semination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the fruits of his
own labor would be served.'
The majority opinion appears inadequate in several respects.
First, the court's commercial exploitation requirement inequi-
tably penalizes celebrities who choose not to commercially ex-
ploit their names or likenesses, but who also wish to prevent
advertisers from receiving the windfall gain from such ex-
ploitation. Second, the court failed to specify whether the ce-
lebrity must use his image in connection with the same type of
product as that promoted by defendant, or whether the com-
mercial exploitation requirement is satisfied as long as the ce-
lebrity has commercially exploited his image once. If the
former is true, then under Lugosi the plaintiff is clearly enti-
tled to no more protection under the right of publicity cause of
action than he is under an unfair competition claim. Third,
while the court's interest in maintaining the free flow of infor-
mation and ideas is laudable, this interest alone is insufficient
to rationalize a denial of descendibility solely because a celeb-
rity elected not to exploit his image during his lifetime.
In her frequently cited dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bird
laid the foundation for California's new statute.' She argued
that unlike the right of privacy, which is personal in nature, the
right of publicity concerns a clearly identifiable commercial as-
set that requires considerable time, energy, and money to de-
velop.47 She observed that the sale of one's persona in
connection with the promotion of commercial products has un-questionably become big business."
Although Chief Justice Bird accepted the possibility of first
amendment conflicts in non-commercial uses, she did not hesi-
tate to find that the right of publicity should descend uncondi-
tionally whenever misappropriation of a celebrity's name or
likeness for advertising purposes is at issue. To hold otherwise
would allow advertisers to become unjustly enriched by usurp-
ing both profit and control of a deceased celebrity's image.49
Finally, recognizing the public's interest in a celebrity's im-
45. I& at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
47. 25 Cal. 3d at 834, 603 P.2d at 438, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id., 603 P.2d at 438, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
49. Id. at 839, 603 P.2d at 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 339; see also Kwall, supra note 4, at
[Vol. 7
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age, Chief Justice Bird recommended that the right of public-
ity, like copyright protection,5° should last for fifty years
following the death of the celebrity.51 At that time, she sug-
gested, the celebrity's image should enter the public domain. 2
The California Supreme Court also addressed the
descendibility issue in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg.' In that
case, the nephew of the decedent Rudolpho Guglielini, known
as the sex symbol Rudolph Valentino, initiated a suit for dam-
ages and injunctive relief against the defendant for using the
decedent's name, likeness, and personality in advertising the
film Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction. In a two para-
graph opinion, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's finding for the defendant.
The Guglielmi decision proves that ambiguity is not unique
to verbose opinions. The court simply said that under Lugosi
the right of publicity is not descendible and expires upon the
death of the protected person.m The court failed to address the
applicability of the commercial exploitation requirement.
In her concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bird reiterated that
the right of publicity should be descendible, but noted that the
right is not absolute. She clarified the first amendment excep-
tions she alluded to in Lugosi"s by explaining that "works of
fiction are constitutionally protected in the same manner as
political treatises and topical news stories.' ' m Furthermore, she
noted that entertainment is worthy of the same constitutional
protection as the exposition of ideas.5 7 Therefore, she con-
cluded, since the defendant's appropriation was for biographi-
cal purposes, it did not constitute an infringement of the right
to publicity under the first amendment.58
50. Copyright protection is extended to authors of original works that are fixed in
a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Copyright ownership may be transferred
in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or operation of law, and may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1982). Works enter the public domain 50 years after
the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
51. 25 Cal. 3d at 847-49, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
52. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
53. 25 Cal. 3d 860,603 P.2d 454,160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). Guglielmi, a companion
case to Lugosi, was decided two days later on December 5, 1979.
54. Id. at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
56. 25 Cal. 3d at 867, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
57. Id., 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
58. Id at 864, 603 P.2d at 458, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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The Second Circuit was the first to interpret California pub-
licity law under Lugosi and Guglielmi in Groucho Marx Pro-
ductions v. Day and Night Co.59 In that case, heirs of the
famous comedy team brought an action to enjoin the defend-
ant's exhibition of a play which featured the comedy style of
the deceased brothers. The Second Circuit reversed the district
court's holding for plaintiffs on the grounds that the Marx
Brothers did not satisfy the commercial exploitation require-
ment during their lifetime so as to trigger descendibility. 6
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the Guglielmi
decision as being too broad.6 1 The court then attempted to ap-
ply the commercial exploitation requirement established in Lu-
gosi. Concluding that the right only descends "in connection
with particular commercial situations--products and services-
that a celebrity promoted during his lifetime,"62 the court held
that an original play was outside the scope of California's right
of publicity protection."
There are two troubling aspects to the Groucho Marx opin-
ion. First, the court's strict interpretation of the commercial
exploitation requirement not only bars descendibility to heirs
of celebrities who decide not to exploit their images, but bars
recovery in instances where there was exploitation of a differ-
ent product or service than that of defendant. Secondly, it
seems that the court's entire discussion of the commercial ex-
ploitation requirement was unnecessary since defendant's in-
fringement for entertainment purposes was excusable on first
amendment grounds.64
The Eleventh Circuit encountered similar confusion when it
attempted to apply California law in a diversity action, Acme
Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock.65 In that case, the dece-
dent entered into an employment contract with the defendant
whereby he assigned his right to use the name of Clyde Behtty
Circus for a period of ten years. During that time, the decedent
died and all rights to payment were transferred pursuant to the
contract to the decedent's wife, the plaintiff. After the ten-year
59. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). California law was applied because the Marx
Brothers were domiciled there. See supra note 11.
60. 689 F.2d at 322.
61. Id. at 320.
62. Id, at 323.
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
65. 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 7
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period, a new contract was signed which recognized the plain-
tiff as the exclusive owner of decedent's name. When the de-
fendant misrepresented itself as owner of the Clyde Beatty
Circus and obtained the federal service mark,66 "Clyde Beatty-
Cole Bros. Circus," the plaintiff commenced an action for viola-
tion of her deceased husband's right of publicity.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's finding for
the defendant. Ignoring the broad Guglielmi decision, the
court followed the Second Circuit's interpretation of Lugosi6 7
The court found that since the decedent had commercially ex-
ploited his name during his lifetime in exactly the same man-
ner as the defendant was attempting, the decedent's position
was distinguishable from Bela Lugosi's. The commercial ex-
ploitation requirement was satisfied and plaintiff was entitled
to recover.6
C. Other Statutory and Case Law
1. States that Reject Descendibility
Several state statutes refuse to extend the right of publicity
to heirs whether or not the deceased commercially exploited
his image during his lifetime. Massachusetts, 69 Rhode Island,70
Utah71 and Wisconsin,7 2 all have statutes that prohibit the mis-
appropriation of another's name, photograph or likeness. How-
66. The term "service mark" means a mark used in the sale or advertising of serv-
ices to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of
others. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
67. 711 F.2d at 1542-44.
68. Id. at 1543-45.
69. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the common-
wealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without his writ-
ten consent may bring a civil action . . . to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of
such use.
70. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1985) provides:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the state for ad-
vertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without his written consent
may bring an action ... to prevent and restrain the use thereof, and may
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3 (1982) provides:
The personal identity of an individual is abused if:
(1) An advertisement is published in which the personal identity of that
individual is used in a manner which expresses or implies that the individual
approves, endorses, has endorsed, or will endorse the specific subject matter
of the advertisement; and
(2) Consent has not been obtained for such use from the individual, or if
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
ever, neither the Massachusetts nor Rhode Island statutes
address whether the right of publicity extends to heirs; it is
likely, therefore, that the right does not descend in these
states.73 Wisconsin's statute specifies that the right only applies
to "living persons. '74 Until 1981, the Utah statute provided that
written consent from a decedent's "heirs or personal represent-
atives" must be obtained before the decedent's name or like-
ness could be used for advertising purposes.75 Utah's current
statute, however, does not make any reference to an heir's right
of publicity. 76 This change in Utah's right of publicity law sug-
gests that the right of publicity does not descend to heirs.
The state of Ohio has rejected descendibility by case law. In
Reeves v. United Artists,7 the plaintiff, the widow of a boxer,
commenced suit to recover profits from the defendant's motion
picture reenactment of one of decedent's fights. The district
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted.
The court recognized that the descendibility of the right of
publicity depends upon the state's classification of the right of
publicity as a tort under privacy law or as a property right.78
Applying the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Zacchini
the individual is a minor, then consent of one of the minor's parents or con-
sent of the minor's legally appointed guardian.
72. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2) (West 1983) provides:
In this section, "invasion of privacy" means...:
(b) The use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, of the name,
portrait or picture of any living person, without having first obtained the
written consent of the person or, if the person is a minor, of his or her parent
or guardian (emphasis added).
73. Nor has case law in Massachusetts and Rhode Island addressed the
descendibility issue.
74. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50(2)(b) (West 1983).
75. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-405, repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 95, § 7, provided:
A person is guilty of abuse of personal identity if, for the purpose of advertis-
ing any articles of merchandise for purposes of trade or for any other adver-
tising purposes, he uses the name, picture, or portrait of any individual or
uses the name or picture of any public institution of this state, the official
title of any public officer of this state, or of any person who is living, without
first having obtained the written consent of the person, or, if the person be a
minor, the written consent of his parent or guardian, or, if the person is dead,
without the written consent of his heirs or personal representatives (empha-
sis added).
76. UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3.
77. 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
78. I at 1234.
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v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.," the court in Reeves spe-
cifically rejected the notion that the right of publicity was a
property right.8° The court concluded that "the right of public-
ity, like the right of privacy, is not descendible."8' Therefore,
although the decedent made his living as a boxer, and thus sat-
isfied the commercial exploitation requirement, Ohio disre-
garded such commercial exploitation in its rejection of the
descendibility of publicity rights.
2. States Where Descendibility is Conditioned Upon
Commercial Exploitation During Lifetime
While there are no statutes that limit descendibility to heirs
of celebrities who exploited their name or likeness during their
lifetime, this condition has been imposed by courts in both New
York and New Jersey.
Prior to 1977, New York expressly rejected the commercial
exploitation requirement. For example, in Price v. Hal Roach
Studios,82 plaintiffs, the widows of Stanley Laurel and Oliver
Hardy, and Larry Harmon Pictures (Harmon)-the assignee in
perpetuity of the right to utilize and merchandize the comedi-
ans' names, likenesses, characters and characterizations-
brought an action against a movie studio that used the Laurel
and Hardy characters in violation of Harmon's exclusive agree-
ment. The district court, holding for the plaintiffs, found that
the actors had publicity rights separate from the employment
contract they had had with the defendant.8 3 In determining
that the publicity right was descendible, the court emphasized
that it is "not [necessary] to exercise the right of publicity dur-
ing one's life in order to protect it from use by others or to pre-
serve any potential right of one's heirs."'s
However, New York courts reexamined the descendibility is-
sue and endorsed the commercial exploitation requirement in
one of several cases brought by the estate of Elvis Presley, Fac-
tors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.85 Beginning in 1954, Pres-
ley's commercial enterprises were managed exclusively by Tom
79. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562
(1977); see supra note 9.
80. 572 F. Supp. at 1235.
81. Id.
82. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
83. Id. at 841.
84. Id. at 846.
85. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Parker in accordance with a series of merchandizing agree-
ments. Boxcar Enterprises (Boxcar) entered the Presley-
Parker relationship in January 1974. On August 18, 1977, two
days after Presley's death, Boxcar assigned to Factors Etc., Inc.
(Factors) the exclusive right to use Presley's likeness in mer-
chandizing souvenirss 6
Shortly thereafter, the defendant, Creative Card Company,
manufactured and distributed posters and other souvenirs of
the deceased superstar. Factors subsequently brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the defendant from commercially exploiting
Presley's image on the grounds that it had the exclusive right
to exercise Presley's right of publicity. In granting the injunc-
tion, the court stated that its legal conclusion was in complete
harmony with the holding in the Guglielmi case: "Elvis Pres-
ley did in life actively exploit protectible commercial rights
which defendant [tried] to invade. 87 While the court did not
specifically articulate that the right of publicity is only descend-
ible when there has been commercial exploitation during a ce-
lebrity's lifetime, both a New York court and a commentator
have so interpreted the case.8
In Hicks v. Casablanca Records,9 the Southern District
Court of New York again faced the descendibility issue in a case
that raised first amendment considerations. Heirs and assign-
ees of Agatha Christie moved to enjoin the defendants from
distributing the motion picture and book "Agatha," a fictional
account of an eleven-day disappearance of the mystery writer.
Although the court found that Christie had sufficiently ex-
ploited her commercial image during her lifetime to enable
transfer of her right of publicity to the plaintiffs, the court cau-
tioned that the right does not generally attach where name or
likeness is used in connection with a book or movie.90 Rather,
the court held that certain first amendment exemptions em-
86. Id. at 280-81.
87. 1l, at 284.
88. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (a
companion case involving the marketing of a poster depicting Presley from 1943-
1977); Kwall, supra note 4, at 218 (the Creative Card decision did not specifically state
that the right of publicity could not survive an individual's death if that person failed
to exercise the right while alive, but the clear import of the decision is that the court
would not allow descendibility under such circumstances).
89. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90. I at 433.
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bodied in New York's right of privacy statute9' are applicable to
the right of publicity. These exemptions include "matters of
news, history, biography, and other factual subjects of public
interest." 2 Thus, had the defendants fraudulently advertised
the works as true accounts when in fact they were falsifica-
tions, the plaintiffs would have been able to enjoin distribution.
However, the court determined that under the facts in question
it would have been evident to the public that the depicted
events were fictitious and that the right of publicity was out-
weighed by the first amendment protection accorded novels
and movies.93
In Estate of Presley v. Russen,94 the descendibility of Elvis
Presley's right of publicity was evaluated by the U.S. District
Court of New Jersey pursuant to New York and California case
law. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction of the defend-
ant's stage production entitled "The Big El Show." The show
was a stage production patterned after an actual Elvis Presley
show, and featured an individual who impersonated the late
singer by performing in his style. The court granted the injunc-
tion, finding that the defendant's purpose in using the show
was primarily commercial, and was, therefore, not entitled to
first amendment protection.9 5 The court affirmed the commer-
cial exploitation requirement by stressing that before the right
of publicity may descend as an intangible property right, the
celebrity must commercially exploit his name or likeness.96
The court found that Presley had sufficiently exploited his
name and likeness during his life through contracts and
licenses, including live musical performances, movies, records
and television performances, and consumer products such as
jewelry and t-shirts.97
91. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976).
92. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 A.D.2d 216, 219, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 453 (1st
Dept. 1965).
93. Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 433.
94. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
95. Id. at 1359.
96. I& at 1355; see also Gleason v. Hustler, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2183 (D.N.J.
1981) (defendant who published deceased's name and photograph succeeded in motion
for summary judgment because deceased had not actively exploited his name and
likeness during his lifetime).
97. 513 F. Supp. at 1345.
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3. States Where Descendibility is Unconditional
Georgia is the only state with case law authorizing
descendibility without requiring lifetime commercial exploita-
tion. In Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v.
American Heritage Products,98 King's likeness was appropri-
ated for memorial plastic busts. The district court found for
the defendant without reaching the descendibility issue on the
grounds that King had not commercially exploited his likeness
while alive. The Eleventh Circuit reversed.
The circuit court's decision was based upon responses to cer-
tified questions submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia."
The Georgia Supreme Court advised the Eleventh Circuit to
embrace the following inquiry in determining whether King's
right of publicity was descendible:
1) Is the "right to publicity" recognized in Georgia as a right
distinct from the right to privacy?
2) If the answer to question (1) is affirmative, does the
"right to publicity" survive the death of its owner? Specifi-
cally, is the right inheritable and devisable?
3) If the answer to question (2) is also affirmative, must the
owner have commercially exploited the right before it can sur-
vive his death?' °°
The Georgia Supreme Court answered the first two questions
affirmatively by applying the reasoning set forth in Lugosi and
the New York cases discussed above.' 0 ' The court decided,
however, that commercial exploitation is not required in Geor-
gia for the right of publicity to descend. The court held that an
heir need only show that the deceased could have exploited his
image, not that he actually did so.10 2 Fearful that denying
descendibility to heirs of individuals who had not exercised the
right would put a premium on exploitation, the court concluded
"[w]e cannot deny [plaintiffs] this right merely because Dr.
98. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Martin Luther King 1].
99. Answering certified questions is permitted pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
3902 (1981); see Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change v. American Heri-
tage Prods., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982) (the Supreme Court of Georgia's re-
sponse to the certified questions regarding the right of publicity propounded by the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit) [hereinafter Martin Luther King II].
100. Martin Luther King 1, 694 F.2d at 674.
101. Martin Luther King II, 250 Ga. at 137-45, 296 S.E.2d at 700-04 reprinted in
Martin Luther King 1, 694 F.2d at 677-82. See text accompanying notes 35-42 and 65-74.
102. Martin Luther King II, 250 Ga. at 146-47, 296 S.E.2d at 705-06 reprinted in
Martin Luther King 1, 694 F.2d at 682-83.
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King chose not to exploit or commercialize himself during hislifetime. ''P103
Several states have enacted statutes that permit an uncondi-
tional right of publicity. Florida,1°4 Nebraska, 0 5 Oklahoma,le"
and Virginia"° have statutes that expressly provide for
103. Martin Luther King II, 250 Ga. at 147, 296 S.E.2d at 706 reprinted in Martin
Luther King 1, 694 F.2d at 683 (emphasis added).
104. FLRA STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972) provides:
(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for pur-
poses of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, por-
trait, photograph or other likeness of any natural person without the express
written or oral consent to such use given by:
(a) Such person; or
(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such
person to license the commercial use of his or her likeness; or
(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation authorized
in writing to license the commercial use of his name or likeness, or if no
person, firm, or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a
class composed of his surviving spouse and surviving children.
(4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publica-
tion, printing, display or other public use of the name or likeness of a person
occurring after the expiration of forty years from and qfter the death of such
person (emphasis added).
105. NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-202 (1983) provides that "[a]ny person, firm, or corpora-
tion that exploits a natural person, name, picture, portrait, or personality for advertis-
ing or commercial purposes shall be liable for invasion of privacy."
§ 20-208 provides:
The right of actionfor invasion of privacy created by Sections 20-201 to 20-211
and 25-840.01, with the single exception of the action arising out of exploita-
tion of a person's name or likeness in section 20-202, shall not be deemed to
survive the death of the subject of any such invasion of privacy (emphasis
added).
106. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 1986) provides:
Any person, firm or corporation that uses for the purpose of advertising for
the sale of any goods, wares or merchandise, or for the solicitation of pa-
tronage by any business enterprise, the name, portrait or picture of any per-
son, without having obtained, prior or subsequent to such use, the consent of
such person, or, if such person is a minor, the consent of a parent or guardian,
and, if such person is deceased, without the consent of the surviving spouse,
personal representatives, or that of a majority of the deceased's adult heirs, is
guilty of a misdemeanor (emphasis added).
107. VA. CODE § 8.01-40 (1984) provides:
A. Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having first
obtained the written consent of such person, or if dead, of the surviving con-
sort and if none, of the next of kin ... for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade, such persons may maintain a suit in equity against the
person, firm, or corporation so using such person's name, portrait, or picture
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover dam-
ages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use....
B. No action shall be commenced under this section more than twenty years
fter the death of such person (emphasis added).
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descendibiity without mentioning a commercial exploitation
requirement. The Florida statute specifies that the right termi-
nates forty years after the decedent's death'8 while Virginia
allows an action only until twenty years after death.10e No du-
ration is provided in the Nebraska 10 or Oklahoma 1 ' statutes.
On June 5, 1984, Tennessee became the first state to statuto-
rily guarantee the descendibility of publicity rights while ex-
pressly abolishing the lifetime commercial exploitation
requirement."2 Until that date, courts applying Tennessee law
had unconditionally rejected any descendibility of the right.113
Tennessee's statute is commendable for several reasons.
First, it clearly classifies the right of publicity as a vested prop-
erty right regardless of lifetime commercial exploitation,"4
thereby precluding a financial windfall to advertisers. In addi-
tion, the statute clarifies that use of a celebrity's likeness in
connection with public affairs or news broadcasts rather than
for commercial gain are permissible "fair uses.""1
5
108. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.8(4).
109. VA. CODE § 8.01-40(B).
110. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-202 to -208.
111. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1.
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (1984) provides that "[elvery individual has a
property right in the use of his name, photograph or likeness in any medium in any
manner."
113. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980)
(estate of Elvis Presley denied relief when defendant used star's likeness in replicas of
statues honoring him); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981)
(the Second Circuit accepted the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee law and
barred recovery in another Elvis Presley appropriation); Lancaster v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1109 (Ch. Ct. Tenn. 1982) (Tennessee Chancery Court
sanctioned another advertiser's commercial usurpation of Presley's image).
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103(b) provides that:
The individual rights . .. constitute property rights and shall be freely as-
signable and licensable, and shall not expire upon the death of the individual
so protected, whether or not such rights were commercially exploited by the
individual during the individual's lifetime, but shall be descendible to the ex-
ecutors, assigns, heirs, or devisees of the individual so protected by this part.
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1107(a) provides that "[i]t shall be deemed a fair use
and no violation of an individual's rights shall be found, for purposes of this part, if
the use of a name, photograph or likeness is in connection with any news, public af-
fairs, or sports broadcast or account."
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) ("the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . , scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright"); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1977) (the fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing
exclusive rights of a copyright holder with the public's interest in the dissemination of
information affecting areas of universal concern such as art, science, history, or
industry).
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One shortcoming of the statute, however, is that heirs may be
divested of publicity rights twelve years after the celebrity's
death. While the statute states that heirs are entitled to the
rights unconditionally for ten years after a celebrity's death, it
provides that the failure to use the rights for any two consecu-
tive years thereafter will result in termination." 6 Under this
provision, it appears that Tennessee is letting the commercial
exploitation requirement "in through the back door." Heirs
who choose not to exploit a celebrity's image will be penalized
and the windfall will, again, go to the advertisers. As Chief
Justice Bird suggested in her Lugosi117 dissenting opinion, the
fifty year copyright protection period seems more appropriate
for publicity rights because the right of publicity and copyright
involve similar intellectual property and first amendment
interests." 8
III
Important Aspects of California's New Law
A. Shift to Property Right
California's new law," 9 enacted only a few months after the
Tennessee statute, provides protection for heirs, while still ad-
dressing first amendment concerns.
The most significant section of California's new law provides
that "the rights recognized under this section are property
rights, freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by
means of trust or testamentary documents."'
By specifying that the right of publicity is a property right,
the Legislature has overturned Lugosi's holding that the right
is personal and thus incapable of transfer. Unlike the personal
right of privacy, the right of publicity apparently may now be
assigned or devised in whole or in part. Rather than lying dor-
mant until violated, the right of publicity can also form an inte-
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) provides that:
The exclusive right to commercial exploitation of the property rights is ter-
minated by proof of the non-use of the name, likeness, or image of any indi-
vidual for commercial purposes by an executor, assignee, heir or devisee to
such use for a period of two (2) years subsequent to the initial ten (10) year
period following the individual's death.
117. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 828, 603 P.2d 425, 434, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 332 (Bird, CJ.,
dissenting).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
U9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
120. Id. § 990(b) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
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gral part of a celebrity's everyday contract negotiations and
estate planning.
Section 990 also contains a provision which clarifies the sta-
tus of the commercial exploitation requirement in California.
In defining the term "deceased personality," section 990 (h)
states that it includes:
[A]ny natural person whose name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or
her death, whether or not during the lifetime of that natural
person the person used his or her name... on or in products,
merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling,
or solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or
service.121
By eliminating the commercial exploitation requirement,
California grants right of publicity protection to all heirs,
whether or not the celebrity chooses to exploit his image. The
only prerequisite to descendibility under the law is an allega-
tion that the individual had the potential to commercially ex-
ploit his image. Unfortunately, the statute does not provide
any guidelines for assessing whether a deceased celebrity had a
name and likeness with commercial value at the time of his
death. Such evaluation will be especially difficult when an heir
brings an action for a wrongful right of publicity use many
years after the death of a celebrity who never commercially ex-
ploited his name or likeness. Nevertheless, although the stat-
ute's standard will probably create challenging questions of fact
for fact-finders, the equities of not requiring lifetime commer-
cial exploitation outweigh any benefits in preserving the com-
mercial exploitation requirement.
B. Shift to Copyright Principles
California's new law closely resembles the Copyright Act of
1976122 in two important respects. The duration and fair use
provisions of the statute mirror those of the Copyright Act.23
Such similarity is desirable in creating uniformity in the rights
and limitations conferred upon the intellectual properties. Cal-
ifornia's statute thus requires that a right of publicity cause of
121. Id. § 990(h) (emphasis added).
122. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
123. Copyright protection lasts for 50 years after the death of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1982). See supra note 115 for examples of allowable fair uses of
copyright protected material.
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action may only arise during the celebrity's lifetime and for
fifty years thereafter.'" However, persons who bring suits
more than one year from the time the misappropriation of the
right of publicity should have been discovered arguably will be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.25 A commenta-
tor has persuasively argued that the reason intellectual cre-
ations are given finite protection is to balance the competing
interests of encouraging creative labor and preserving the first
amendment free flow of information. 2 Thus, the statute pro-
vides that at the end of fifty years, the celebrity's publicity
rights enter the public domain and can then be exploited freely.
The new statute also protects first amendment interests by
providing that certain uses do not constitute appropriations of
publicity rights. Under the statute, a celebrity's image may be
permissibly incorporated into the following:
1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition,
film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement
or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).
2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.
3) Single and original works of fine art.
4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use
permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).'
The "fair use" provisions of the Copyright Act l28 firmly es-
tablish that an individual's creative efforts may be copied pro-
vided that the infringer's purpose is not substantially
commercial.2' The policy underlying the fair use doctrine as-
sures public access to knowledge of general import. °30 Simi-
larly, the right of publicity exceptions set forth in the
California statute should serve to guarantee access to biograph-
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp. 1985).
125. It seems likely that the right of publicity will be classified as a tort for statute
of limitations purposes. Consequently, a right of publicity action must be brought
within one year of its discovery. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 312, 340(3) (West Supp.
1985).
126. Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity, supra note 4, at 1125.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n) (West Supp. 1985)
128. See supra note 115.
129. See, e.g., Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171,
1175-78 (5th Cir. 1980) ("fair use" doctrine permitted display by newspaper, in its pro-
gram of comparative advertising promoting its television program guide publication,
of covers of old issues of another publisher's copyrighted competing publication, par.
ticularly in light of the fact that the competing publication was not significantly
harmed by the advertisements).
130. H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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ical information about the celebrity without allowing exploita-
tion for purely commercial purposes. Consequently, if the
Guglielmi13 1 and Hicks'32 cases were now tried in California,
the defendants' use of the celebrities' names and likenesses in
connection with biographical works would be permissible.
Finally, the new statute, not unlike copyright law, states that
registration of the successors-in-interest's claim of rights with
the Secretary of State is a prerequisite to commencement of a
lawsuit.' -  The statute specifies who, in absence of an inter
vivos transfer of the right by the celebrity, the successors-in-
interest will be for purposes of a lawsuit.'3 4 In the event there
are no surviving persons as specified by statute, the right termi-
nates and enters the public domain."s'
131. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352.
132. 464 F. Supp. 426.
133. CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(f)(2) (West Supp. 1985); 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982) (re-
quires that before commencement of a lawsuit, a copyright must be registered with
the Copyright Office).
134. CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(d) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), after the death of any person, the rights
under this section shall belong to the following person or persons and may be
exercised, on behalf of and for the benefit of all those persons, by those per-
sons who, in the aggregate, are entitled to more than a one-half interest in
such rights:
(1) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving spouse of the
deceased personality unless there are any surviving children or grandchil-
dren of the deceased personality, in which case one-half of the entire interest
in those rights belong to the surviving spouse.
(2) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving children of
the deceased personality and to the surviving children of any dead child of
the deceased personality unless the deceased personality has a surviving
spouse, in which case the ownership of a one-half interest in rights is divided
among the surviving children and grandchildren.
(3) If there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving children or grandchil-
dren, then the entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving parent or
parents of the deceased personality.
(4) The rights of the deceased personality's children and grandchildren are
in all cases divided among them and exercisable on a per stirpes basis accord-
ing to the number of the deceased personality's children represented; the
share of the children of a dead child of a deceased personality can be exer-
cised only by the action of the majority of them. For the purposes of this
section, "per stirpes" is defined in Section 240 of the Probate Code.
135. 1& § 990(e) provides that "[i]f any deceased personality does not transfer his
or her rights under this section by contract, or by means of a trust or testamentary
document, and there are no surviving persons as described in subdivision (d), then the
rights set forth in subdivision (a) shall terminate."
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C. Likely Effect of California's New Law
California's new lawl s extending the right of publicity to
heirs will likely be welcomed with gratitude and relief. Courts
both in and out of California, celebrities and their heirs, and
the citizens of California will all benefit from the clarity and
apparent fairness of the law.
Courts required to interpret the law will appreciate the lack
of the ambiguity they faced when applying Lugosi and Gug-
lielmi. Since there is no longer a lifetime commercial exploita-
tion requirement, the court need only determine whether the
decedent's name, likeness, photograph, voice or signature could
have been used for commercial exploitation during the dece-
dent's lifetime. Furthermore, if the use falls into one of the
areas protected by the first amendment, the court can simply
dismiss the case without further consideration.
Celebrities in California will now be able to devise another
property right. Since celebrities often do not reach their peak
of fame and fortune until late in life, devising their property
rights may be the only way that some celebrities can exert con-
trol over the sometimes quite substantial royalties from their
publicity rights.. 37 In addition," California celebrities will not
feel compelled to exercise their publicity rights for the sole
purpose of satisfying the former commercial exploitation condi-
tion to descendibility.
California will clearly benefit by the new law. Artistic crea-
tivity will be encouraged as a consequence of allowing a celeb-
rity to include his publicity rights as part of his estate.1 3s Prior
to the statute's enactment, many attorneys told their celebrity
clients to incorporate or establish domicile in states with more
favorable descendibility laws."3 Now, more celebrities will be
encouraged to reside and/or incorporate in California to receive
the new statutory protection. Finally, since California contrib-
utes so much to the entertainment industry, it should be desira-
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
137. See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 28. See, e.g., Sales v. Christy, 168 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 62, 63 (Pat. Office Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1970) ("Soupy Sales" prod-
ucts); Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1981, 3, at 1, col. 1 (John Lennon memorabilia valued
in excess of $1 million).
138. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. at 429-30; Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. at 838-39.
139. Telephone interview with 'associate' of Loeb & Loeb, Attorneys at Law, Los
Angeles, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1984).
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ble for the industry's participants to remain in California and
enjoy the benefits of California's laws.
IV
Conclusion
In extending the right of publicity to heirs, California has re-
classified the right as a commercial asset, thereby adding a new
dimension to property law. Celebrities with publicity rights
that have potential commercial value will now be able to leave
those rights to heirs, or alternatively, be assured that the rights
will descend by statute. California has succeeded in statutorily
protecting publicity rights without penalizing celebrities who
choose not to exercise the right of publicity. California's law
guarantees that those parties with the greatest claim to the de-
cedent's publicity rights-the heirs and assignees-will control
how those rights are commercially exploited. Furthermore, ad-
vertisers will be prevented from receiving undeserved wind-
falls from misappropriation of celebrities' images. What was
once a reproachable area of California law should now serve as
a statutory guideline for other states wishing to extend the
right of publicity to heirs.
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